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*E.H.R.L.R. 663 This article explores the issue of blanket legal prohibitions and how these sit with
proportionality under the ECHR and the HRA as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights
and English courts. The author first looks at Strasbourg case law and factors examined by the
European Court in deciding whether a fact-insensitive law is proportionate. He then considers the
domestic decision of R. (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for
Culture, Media and Sport and finally analyses the difficulties this approach raises in giving effect to
Convention rights under the mechanisms of the HRA.
Introduction
In his most famous work, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart recognised a fundamental tension inherent
in all legal systems: on the one hand there is a need for laws to be certain so that individuals are able
to conduct their lives in a reasonably predictable environment, knowing in advance what the
consequences of their actions will be; set against this is the need for laws to be sufficiently flexible or
fact-sensitive so as to be able to take account of differing factual situations.1 This tension becomes
yetmore acute in those systems in which human rights norms are afforded enhanced legal protection
against legislative incursion. In the interests of legal certainty legislatures sometimes enact laws that
create “bright line” rules or blanket prohibitions which admit of very little flexibility or very little scope
for discretion to be exercised by those charged to apply the rule. Such inflexible rules may well
impinge on the human rights of those they affect. Moreover they may catch within their broad sweep
or fine mesh those upon whom the impact, because of their individual circumstances, is particularly
harsh. They may even catch those whose circumstances are at the very periphery, or even out-with,
the justifications for the existence of the bright line rule or blanket prohibition in the first place. The
question arises as to whether, and if so when, such inflexible blanket rules *E.H.R.L.R. 664 which do
not take account of individual circumstances can meet with the requirement of proportionality as
prescribed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Human Rights Act 1998
(HRA).2 This question has been considered recently by the Administrative Court in the case of R. (on
the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 3
which concerned the absolute, blanket prohibition on broadcast political advertising under s.321 of the
Communications Act 2003.
This article will explore the issue by briefly reviewing the Strasbourg case law and suggesting that a
crucial factor in determining whether a fact-insensitive law will be found to be proportionate will be the
margin of appreciation that the European Court is prepared to afford the state. Then the decision in
Animal Defenders will be considered, and in the following section it will be contended that the way the
Administrative Court interpreted its role, in the context of assessing the proportionality (and thus
human rights compliancy) of the blanket ban on broadcast political advertising, highlights some
hitherto unforeseen problems with the mechanism chosen by Parliament to give effect to Convention
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rights in the HRA. It will be argued that the approach strongly steers the judges into a position where
they will almost inevitably be forced to resolve the Hartian tension outlined above in favour of certainty
at the expense of fact-sensitivity. This will often lead to a very different approach to that adopted by
the European Court of Human Rights and will lead to rights being lost in translation between
Strasbourg and the United Kingdom. Finally, a potential solution to this problem will be tentatively
suggested.
The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to fact-insensitive laws
There have been several cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights in which the
question of whether rigid, fact-insensitive laws can meet with the strictures of proportionality has been
addressed. The answers provided as to how the tension between fact-sensitivity and legal certainty
should be resolved have been widely divergent. Two examples of this divergent approach can be
seen in the recent Grand Chamber decisions in Hirst v United Kingdom 4 and Evans v United
Kingdom. 5 In Hirst the fact-insensitive law imposing a blanket ban on all convicted prisoners voting in
the United Kingdom6 no matter what their offence or sentence, was held to be a disproportionate
interference with the right to vote under Art.3 of Protocol No.1 ECHR. The Court stated that the
principle of proportionality required a “discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the
conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned”.7 By contrast, in Evans v United Kingdom a
fact-insensitive law requiring the continuing consent of both donors in the in vitro fertilisation process
(IVF) *E.H.R.L.R. 665 (up until the point at which the embryo was implanted in the woman's body)
failing which the embryos would be destroyed,8 was found to be a proportionate interference with the
right to respect for a private and family life under Art.8 ECHR. This was held to be the case even
where the application of the rigid rule meant that the applicant's chances of having genetically related
children were ended for ever.
One of the factors the European Court of Human Rights takes into account in deciding whether a
fact-insensitive law is a proportionate interference with a Convention right is the degree of difficulty
that the state would encounter if it did introduce a more fact-sensitive rule, for example, the likelihood
that the primary policy aim would, in practice, be frustrated by such a law or that such a law might
have other undesirable consequences, especially, for example, unduly compromising legal certainty.9
Thus in Evans the Court accepted that:
“the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the problems of
arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing, on a case by case basis … ‘entirely
incommensurable’ interests.”10
Furthermore the Court noted the painstaking deliberation that had taken place in drawing up the legal
regime in relation to IVF.11 By contrast in Hirst the Court accepted that whilst some restriction on
prisoner voting might be acceptable, there was no justification for such a “general, automatic and
indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right”.12 Very little was advanced by way of
governmental justification for a blanket ban on all prisoner voting (as opposed to some restriction).
The Court also noted the distinct absence of any serious debate on the issue when it had been before
Parliament.13
Whilst such factors are highly relevant to the European Court's determination of whether a
fact-insensitive rule meets with the requirements of proportionality, it is apparent that another crucial
factor is the width of the margin of appreciation that it is prepared to allow to the defendant state.14
The importance of the margin of appreciation *E.H.R.L.R. 666 can be seen when comparing two
outwardly very similar cases in the field of broadcast advertising: VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v
Switzerland 15 and Murphy v Ireland. 16
VgT concerned the blanket prohibition in Swiss law on broadcast “political” advertising.17 The
applicant, a vegetarian organisation, produced a short film contrasting the life of factory farmed pigs
with that of their wild, forest dwelling cousins and imploring viewers to “eat less meat”. The Swiss
authorities refused to screen the film on the ground that it was a political advertisement. VgT applied
to the European Court claiming a breach of the right to freedom of expression under Art.10.
The Government argued that the ban was needed to:
“protect public opinion from the pressures of powerful financial groups and from undue commercial
influence, to provide a certain equality of opportunity among different forces in society, to ensure
editorial independence from powerful sponsors and support the press.”18
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The Court accepted that powerful financial groups can obtain competitive advantages through
commercial advertising and may thereby exert pressure on broadcasters--an eventuality which would
undermine the fundamental role of Art.10 in preserving democratic and pluralistic society.19 However
the applicant organisation was not such a “powerful financial group”; it did not have the resources to
cause those damaging consequences that, the Government asserted, constituted the reason for the
ban. Rather than trying to abuse a competitive advantage, all it intended to do with its commercial
was to participate in an “ongoing general debate on animal protection and the rearing of animals”.
As to the width of the appropriate margin of appreciation, the Government argued that since the case
concerned the regulation of advertising, an area on which the European Court has generally allowed
states much latitude, it should be afforded a wide margin. However the Court noted that this case did
not involve regular commercial advertising in the sense that it was intended to persuade the public to
buy a particular product. Rather it “reflected controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in
general”; indeed the very reason the advert had been banned by the Swiss authorities was because it
was regarded as “political”.20 Because the issue concerned the applicants' “participation in a debate
affecting the general interest”, the margin of appreciation was correspondingly narrow.21
Thus the Court held there to be a breach of Art.10 because the blanket ban caught within its fine
meshed net not just those wealthy organisations who could pose the *E.H.R.L.R. 667 threat which
constituted the raison d'être for the ban, but also those who manifestly could not.
Murphy v Ireland concerned, on the face of it, strikingly similar facts to those of VgT. Mr Murphy, a
pastor for the Irish Faith Centre, submitted an advertisement for a religious gathering to a local
commercial radio station for transmission. In Irish law, however, there was a blanket ban on, amongst
other things, broadcast religious advertisements.22 Consequently his submission was refused. Mr
Murphy therefore applied to Strasbourg claiming a breach of Art.10 on the same basis as had been
claimed by VgT: that a blanket ban constituted a disproportionate interference with his freedom of
expression.
The Court accepted that the state's aims of ensuring respect for religious doctrines and beliefs of
others met the Art.10(2) aims of ensuring public order and safety and the rights and freedoms of
others.23 The key question, as in VgT, was whether a blanket prohibition on a type of broadcast
expression was a proportionate way of attempting to achieve these aims.
The applicant claimed that, rather than impose a blanket ban, the state could have achieved its aims
by way of a more fact-sensitive rule which could take more account of his particular circumstances.
After all he did not pose any threat to religious harmony or the rights and freedoms of others. The
Court, however, accepted the Government's arguments that a more finely tuned approach would not
have been practicable:
“a provision allowing one religion, and not another, to advertise would be difficult to justify and … a
provision which allowed … filtering by the State or any organ designated by it, on a case by case
basis, of unacceptable or excessive religious advertising would be difficult to apply fairly, objectively
and coherently.”24
The Court accepted the Government's argument that the exclusion of all religious groupings
generated “less discomfort than any filtering of the amount and content of such expression by such
groupings”.25 Further, it was reasonable for the state to conclude that such a system would favour the
dominant religion over those with fewer adherents and resources--the level playing field between
religions in the medium with the most powerful impact, would be jeopardised; finally there was no
consensus on the delicate matter of religion or religious advertising throughout Europe.
Even though the actual advertisement in issue in Murphy was not offensive, was innocuous and
informational, and the applicant was not a wealthy organisation that would have been able to buy up
large chunks of airtime and dominate the airwaves, the ban was still held to be proportionate.
The key to understanding the differing resolutions of the certainty/fact-sensitivity tension in Murphy
and VgT lies in the margin of appreciation that the European Court *E.H.R.L.R. 668 was willing to
allow.26 This in turn depended on the nature of the right being claimed. Indeed the Court in Murphy
expressly stated that it was the religious nature of the expression that resulted in a wider margin of
appreciation being afforded than was the case in VgT where political expression was concerned:
“… there is little scope under Art.10 (2) of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on
debate of questions of public interest … However, a wider margin of appreciation is generally
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available to … States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend
intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion … it is this margin of
appreciation which distinguishes [Murphy ] from [VgT ]. In the latter case … the advertisement …
concerned a matter of public interest to which a reducedmargin of appreciation applied.”27
Freedom of political expression has an obvious instrumental value: the goal of securing effective
representative democracy--the sine qua non of effective rights protection28 --is served by having a
strong protection for public interest “political” expression. Freedom of political speech underpins the
entire system. The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the “freedom of political debate is at
the very core of the concept of democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention”.29 It is in
tune with a long and authoritative line of Convention case law that the margin of appreciation
accorded in VgT, a public interest/political expression case, was very narrow.30 By contrast the
instrumental value of religious expression is less obvious; it primarily benefits the individual who
chooses to engage in it. As Andrew Geddis says:
“because religious expression is not thought to generate as great an externalised benefit for society
as a whole when compared to political expression, there is less of a ‘thumb on the scale’ when it
comes to weighing the value of the speech against the possible harms it may engender.”31
*E.H.R.L.R. 669 To summarise: the attitude of the Strasbourg Court to the proportionality of
fact-insensitive laws depends on the ability of the state to argue that the detrimental consequences
(usually in terms of uncertainty and arbitrariness) of having a more fact-sensitive law would outweigh
the advantages (in terms of being able to fine-tune the law's application to the facts of the individual
case).32 The margin of appreciation accorded is critical in the allocation of weight to the factors
involved in this balancing act and this in turn will depend on the nature and content of the right at
stake.33
The United Kingdom's statutory blanket ban on broadcast political advertising and
the Animal Defenders International case
The question of how to resolve the Hartian tension appropriately has recently been revisited in R. (on
the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (
Animal Defenders International ).34 The case concerned the blanket ban on the use of the broadcast
media for political advertising under the Communications Act 2003.35 During the parliamentary
debates on the Communications Bill, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa
Jowell M.P., summed up the rationale for the prohibition: “By denying powerful interests the chance to
skew political debate, the current ban safeguards the public and democratic debate, and protects the
impartiality of broadcasters”.36
To this end s.319(2)(g) imposes a duty on broadcasting regulator Ofcom to ensure that political
advertising is not included in television or radio services. Section 321(2) states (a) that an
advertisement will contravene the prohibition if it is inserted “by or on behalf of a body whose objects
are wholly or mainly of a political nature” or (b) if it is “directed towards a political end”. Section 321(3)
defines “objects of a political *E.H.R.L.R. 670 nature” and “political ends” extremely widely so as to
include, inter alia, “influencing the policy of any government” or of “any persons carrying out public
functions in any country” and “influencing public opinion on a matter of public controversy in the
United Kingdom”. Once an advertisement is deemed to fall within these parameters Ofcom has no
discretion to allow it.
During the passage of the Communications Bill the Government was so unsure as to its compatibility,
especially in the light of the European Court's judgment in VgT, that it took the unusual step of
including a statement under s.19(1)(b) HRA that “although … unable to make a statement of
compatibility [it] nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.37
In 2005 Animal Defenders International, a non-profit, non-charitable organisation whose objects are to
protect animals and alleviate their suffering began to prepare a campaign, entitled My Mate's a
Primate, against the use of primates for human entertainment in zoos and circuses. A 20 second
television advertisement was proposed, depicting a girl in a cage with a voice-over talking about
man's ill-treatment of primates, and inviting the public to find out more by sending £10 for an
information pack. The script was submitted for pre-clearance but the regulator refused on the grounds
that it would fall foul of the statutory prohibition on political advertisements.38
Animal Defenders International applied for a judicial review claiming that the s.321 ban constituted a
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breach of its rights under Art.10 ECHR.39 Section 3 of the HRA imposes a duty on UK courts, as far
as it is possible to do so, to read and give effect to all legislation in a way which is compatible with
Convention rights. In the hearing before the Administrative Court it was accepted by both parties that
the terms of the prohibition were so clear and all-encompassing that, if it were found to be
incompatible, s.3 of the HRA could not be used to read it compatibly. The only question before the
court, therefore, was whether a declaration of incompatibility under s.4 of the HRA should be made.
Whilst UK courts are obliged to “take into account” the Strasbourg court's case law they are “not
strictly required to follow [its] rulings”.40 Nevertheless Lord Bingham stated in Kay v Lambeth LBC that
it is:
“ordinarily the clear duty of … domestic courts, save where and so far as constrained by primary
legislation, to give practical recognition to the principles laid down by the Strasbourg Court … That
Court is the highest judicial authority on the interpretation of [Convention] rights, and the effectiveness
of the Convention as an international instrument depends on the loyal acceptance by member states
of the principles it lays down.”41
*E.H.R.L.R. 671 Having regard to the European Court's line on blanket bans, its stance on political
expression and, in particular, the decision in VgT it might have been thought that whilst some
restrictions on broadcast political advertising may have been legitimate so as to protect the integrity of
the democratic process, such a widely drawn blanket prohibition which took no account of the
circumstances of the individual case must have been disproportionate. Admittedly here the Court
was, in Lord Bingham's terms, “constrained by primary legislation”, but the authority of VgT would
seem to have supported a finding that the ban was disproportionate.
The Administrative Court, however, declined to follow VgT. The approach of the Strasbourg Court
was castigated as overly fact-sensitive, rendering it, according to Ousley J., “one of those ECtHR
decisions which suffers from unclear or unsound reasoning”, one that the “UK Courts should not
follow”42 and “simply … not a case which can be applied to other cases”.43 Auld L.J. put it thus:
“Given the Strasbourg Court's focus on the particular facts in VGT, including its disregard [sic] of the
fact that VGT was not a powerful player, that it was in opposition to powerful commercial interests,
and that, because the nature of their interests was respectively ‘political’ and ‘economic’ the
prohibition was, on that account, discriminatory, it is hard to see why such fact-sensitive and, in any
event, arguably aberrant reasoning should be a basis for concluding that similar legislation within the
HRA framework should be regarded as incompatible with Art.10.”44
The Court was, however, prepared to follow the approach adopted by the Strasbourg Court in Murphy
notwithstanding the fact that it concerned religious rather than political expression.45 In that case, the
Court said, the great power of the broadcast media had been taken into account (thus justifying
differential treatment between the broadcast media and other media and buttressing the argument
that the ban was proportionate)46 ; and it had been accepted that it would have been impossible in
practice to have adopted a more fact-sensitive regime.47
The Court held that the question of whether restrictions should be imposed on broadcast political
advertising, and the way in which they should be imposed, was one *E.H.R.L.R. 672 on which
deference should be shown to Parliament. Indeed “the permissible width of the discretionary area of
judgment allowed to Parliament in relation to its prohibition on political advertising” was the “central
issue” in the claim.48 Auld L.J. said:
“… in such matters of social and political judgment, the executive and legislative
authorities--particularly the latter--… may normally be expected to have a better or surer grasp of its
democratic needs and their practicalities than the Strasbourg Court or its own courts. Therein lies the
notion of deference which … still stands as a caution to our courts against interfering too readily with
the Government's policies or Parliament's legislative schemes in implementation of them.”49
According to the Court Parliament was best placed to decide that broadcasting political
advertisements should be banned in the broadcast media--because of its (broadcasting's) perceived
greater potency as compared to other media and the risk of the democratic process being skewed by
wealthy interests dominating the airwaves.
Alternative, less restrictive, more fact-sensitive schemes proposed by the claimants may have been
possible, for example restricting the ban to election periods, or drawing a distinction between party
political matters and “social advocacy” on other matters of public concern. But the Court accepted the
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Government's arguments that to have enacted a more nuanced rule would have tended to undermine
the policy objective underpinning the ban:
“[T]o have attempted to limit the prohibition by amore restricted and more precise definition of such
bodies or ends would have defeated the overriding objective of preventing the distortion of political
debate which takes many forms and embraces a vast range of matters of public importance and
interest.”50
Furthermore it would have introduced uncertainty and arbitrariness into an otherwise certain system:
“[I]t would have engendered much uncertainty and scope for litigation, and would have invited evasion
by political parties thus disadvantaged to ‘contract’ out their political advertising to other bodies or
individuals.”51
“It is clear that part of the justification for the complete ban is the real difficulty of drawing any rational,
practicable distinctions between parties, groups and types of advertisements.”52
Consequently this was appropriately a matter for Parliament:
“No doubt Parliament could have devised a form of words which would present a solution of sorts to
any problem as to where a line was drawn as between types and advertiser or advertisement.
However, the complexities and inevitable arbitrariness *E.H.R.L.R. 673 of any solution, such as it
might be called, are proper matters for Parliament to consider in deciding that a complete ban on
broadcasting advertisements is the only practicable and fair answer.”53
As a consequence of the above reasoning the Court found that the provision was not incompatible
with Art.10.54
To summarise: the Administrative Court held that it was necessary to restrict access to broadcasting
facilities in order to protect the integrity of the democratic process. Parliament was particularly well
qualified to make this call and it should be afforded a discretionary area of judgment. Furthermore the
manner in which it chose to do that was a matter for Parliament which was better placed than the
Court to assess the potential pitfalls of more fact-sensitive solutions.
Rights lost in translation?
It will be contended that the Administrative Court's approach to the question of fact-insensitive law will
inexorably steer the judges towards resolving the tension between legal certainty and fact-sensitivity
in favour of the former. This will result in a divergence of approach between the Strasbourg Court and
domestic courts leading to Convention rights being lost in translation.
It will be recalled that in Animal Defenders International s.3 of the HRA was not in play: ss.319 and
321 of the Communications Act used language which was so clear and all-encompassing that it was
obvious to the Court that it represented a “deliberate policy choice by Parliament to impose a ban on
broadcast advertising in as wide and all embracing terms as possible”.55 The only option open to
Animal Defenders International was to challenge the legislation under s.4 of the HRA. Under s.4(2)
the court is empowered to declare legislation incompatible with Convention rights. However the
Administrative Court expressly disavowed an approach that would have permitted it to examine the
precise impact of a legislative measure and assess whether there had been a disproportionate
interference with rights on the precise facts of Animal Defenders International's case. Under the HRA:
“The concern … is as to the compatibility of the statutory prohibition, not as to a narrower question,
namely whether … a statutory prohibition is justifiable in the particular circumstances of the case.”56
“The Strasbourg Court in VGT, … accorded the Swiss Court only a narrow margin of appreciation as
to the consistency with Art.10 of the application of the prohibition in the circumstances of the
particular case. An English court, in considering the *E.H.R.L.R. 674 compatibility of a statutory
provision under section 4 of the HRA has a different and broader task, namely ‘whether a provision of
primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right’.”57
“[I]n relation to … VGT … the task for this Court in determining whether a UK statute is incompatible
with an ECHR obligation is broader and not so fact sensitive, otherwise the compatibility of the ECHR
of our legislation would be vulnerable to constant challenge and re-challenge according to the
individual circumstances of each case. In short, on a compatibility challenge, this Court has often to
paint with a broader brush than the Strasbourg Court--another way of expressing the ‘bright line’
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approach.”58
The import of these dicta is that if a UK court is considering whether to make a declaration of
incompatibility it cannot and should not adopt a fact-sensitive approach. Its task is to decide whether
the provision as a whole is incompatible; not to determine whether, on the facts of a particular case, it
has resulted in an outcome that is incompatible. According to this reasoning, if the provision is
globally capable of justification, irrespective of the impact on a particular claimant, and irrespective of
whether the rationale behind the provision is in alignment with the circumstances of the individual
claimant, it will not be found to be incompatible. According to the Administrative Court s.4 is a zero
sum game. If the provision is capable of being applied compatibly at all then the fact that it may have
a particularly harsh impact on an individual claimant will not render it disproportionate.
It becomes apparent that there is a gap in rights protection under the HRA's scheme. The mechanism
introduced to make rights enforceable in UK courts seems to contain a strong systemic impetus to
resolve the Hartian tension in favour of legal certainty at the expense of fact-sensitivity. If legislation is
drafted in a clear and all-encompassing way so as to make the intention of Parliament crystal clear, it
will be safe from reading down under s.3. The only hope for the claimant then will be to argue for a
declaration under s.4--that the legislation is disproportionate because of its overly harsh application in
their particular case. But the court will not be able to adopt such a fact-sensitive approach: it cannot,
all it can do is to declare the entire provision to be incompatible, and if it is capable of justification this
will not be possible:
“[The court's] task is not, in the words of the Strasbourg Court … [to determine] whether the statutory
interference with the freedom of expression in question ‘served to justify the interference in the
particular circumstances of the … case’, or, … whether it has, in the circumstances, ‘achieved the
result called for by the Convention’. Their task is [to determine] whether the United Kingdom statutory
prohibition in question is in itself, and, given its permissible interpretation and application, compatible
in the sense of being capable of justification under Article 10(2).”59
*E.H.R.L.R. 675 If this is right then blanket proscriptions are in fact insulated from human rights
challenge in the domestic courts. Indeed, paradoxically, in Animal Defenders International the very
rigidity and absence of fact-sensitivity which, intuitively and in principle, ought to have rendered the
provision at least more likely to be found to be disproportionate in fact had the opposite effect: it put it
beyond the reach of the s.3 interpretive provision; and the very wide cast of the fine meshed net
meant that more was at stake in s.4 compatibility terms--for the wider the net is cast the more likely it
is to catch cases that are within the legislative aim as well as those that are not--and if the net catches
mainly the tuna (that are within the legislative compass)--the fact that it also catches the occasional
dolphin (that are not) does not render it incompatible--they are just, to switch metaphors, collateral
damage in an otherwise just war.
The potency of this immunisation from human rights based challenge is augmented when the courts
show deference to Parliament and adopt the stance that Parliament must have had good reasons and
is much better placed than the court to make the call that alternative, more finely tailored approaches
would not have been preferable.60 Indeed the very fact that it was Parliament's decision to impose a
blanket ban carried weight in persuading the Court to show deference: “The experience, expertise
and judgment of Parliament expressed in the legislation can demonstrate the necessary justification”.
61
“I also give Parliament's considered view great weight because of the subject matter. The impact of
broadcasting on the topics, framework and intensity of political debate is one which few would be
better placed to assess than those who deal on a daily basis with constituents and interest groups,
whether to enlist, respond to or resist their influence. They would be well placed to know what manner
of groups there were or might be who would take advantage of degrees of alteration to the present
ban. It is not contestable that Parliament, through its M.P.s and politically active peers, is far better
placed to reach a judgment on those matters than judges. This is not an area which more readily falls
into the sphere in which judges are more experienced and expert. This is the more true of
non-national judges.”62
The issue of judicial deference has been widely debated and hotly contested both judicially and
academically.63 There is not the space to enter that debate here, but it *E.H.R.L.R. 676 might be
ventured that the level of deference accorded by domestic courts ought at least to mirror that afforded
to states by the Strasbourg court. In an area so jealously guarded by that Court as political expression
it might be thought that the generous measure of deference afforded in Animal Defenders
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International was inappropriate. The contention of the Administrative Court that M.P.s and peers are
better placed--have greater institutional capacity--than the courts in regulating broadcast political
speech runs counter to the whole tenor of the Strasbourg approach.64
Conclusion
One of the difficulties with the Administrative Court's approach in Animal Defenders International is
that it cuts against the primary motivation for the passage of the HRA in the first place; namely to
“bring rights home”, to allow human rights claims to be dealt with domestically rather than at the
Strasbourg Court.65 The Court's opinion in Animal Defenders International was that it simply was not
furnished with the juridical tools with which to afford protection to those who were caught by the fine
meshed net of fact-insensitive legislation in situations where some justification had been given for the
necessity of an inflexible rule. It is likely, however, that claimants who fail in such cases will apply to
the Strasbourg Court whose task is (in some circumstances at any rate) to determine whether a
“statutory prohibition is justifiable in the particular circumstances of the case”.66 Further, in a case
such as Animal Defenders International, given the narrow margin of appreciation afforded in cases of
political expression and the Strasbourg Court's willingness in those kinds of cases to adopt an
approach that is intolerant of fact-insensitive laws, it is likely that that Court will find a violation. If so
the HRA will have failed in its objective.
It has been argued by various commentators that one of the ways in which the HRA was designed to
“give further effect”67 to Convention rights was by instituting, primarily via the interplay of s.3 and s.4,
a dialogue between the different actors within the constitution. During the passage of the Human
Rights Bill the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw M.P., said that:
*E.H.R.L.R. 677 “Parliament and the judiciary must engage in a serious dialogue about the operation
and development of the rights in the Bill … this dialogue is the only way in which we can ensure the
legislation is a living development that assists our citizens.”68
Yet the approach in Animal Defenders International is to act as a conversation stopper. If the analysis
in Animal Defenders International is right then any judicial ability to signal, via the medium of a s.4
declaration, that there may be a problem with the compatibility of fact-insensitive legislation will be
lost; the conversation will be over.
It will be briefly and tentatively suggested that a possible solution to this problem may be found within
the text of the HRA itself. It will be recalled that s.3 requires that all legislation, “whenever enacted”,69
“so far as it is possible … must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention
rights”.70 Section 3 therefore must apply to the interpretation of the provisions of the HRA itself,
including s.4. The Court in Animal Defenders International imposed a self-denying ordinance with
regard to its role under s.4 because it perceived its task to be “broader” than and “not so fact
sensitive” as that of the Strasbourg Court.71 If, on the other hand, it had interpreted its role under s.4
through the prism of s.3, it would have to have given effect to Convention rights as far as possible. In
the circumstances (namely, not being able to use s.3 to read down s.321) this would have required
the making of a declaration of incompatibility and the HRA dialogue could have continued.
A s.4 declaration should be seen as a major part of the machinery by which Parliament intended to
bring rights home and give them further effect in the United Kingdom (whether or not this is given the
label “dialogue”).72 A s.4 declaration does not affect the continuing validity of the legislation73 ; it is for
government and Parliament to decide what, if any, action should be taken to remedy any defect that
has been signalled by the court. This is surely what a claimant in Animal Defenders International's
position is entitled to expect under the HRA's scheme; he may not be able to secure an immediate
remedy under s.3, but at least the constitutional mechanism for the protection of rights will be utilised.
In that way his rights will be, to the greatest possible extent in the circumstances, given effect.
*E.H.R.L.R. 678 The Administrative Court's assessment of its role in Animal Defenders International
has the consequence of systemically favouring certainty at the expense of fact-sensitivity. If the
alternative approach suggested above is adopted it will allow a more accurate translation of
Strasbourg principles into the domestic sphere. Furthermore it will permit the HRA mechanisms
introduced by Parliament in 1998 to be used to their full extent and avoid unnecessary applications to
the European Court of Human Rights.
E.H.R.L.R. 2007, 6, 663-678
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